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Alfredo Burlando 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) lend to impoverished communities with the 
goal of spurring increases in income, consumption, business activity, and decision 
making power. My research looks at how the formal banking sector responds to MFI 
branch entry. I use data from a randomized control study done by Banerjee et al. (2013) 
which allows me to control for endogeneity biases associated with MFI entry. I look at 
how bank loan take-up and bank loan amounts change over the course of the study as 
well as how clientele characteristics compare between those that borrow from banks and 
MFIs. I find no significant differences in bank loan take-up or bank loan amount 
between treatment and control areas, suggesting the banking sector does little to 
respond to competition from MFIs. I test this zero effect on a variety of different 
variables and parameters via a multitude of difference in difference estimators and I 
reach the same zero-effect conclusion. I find multiple significant differences in 
characteristics between MFI and bank borrowers. I conclude that MFIs and the formal 
banking sector operate in relatively separate marketspaces with little to no competition.    
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Introduction 
This study examines one of the institutions set up to combat global poverty – 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). Specifically, I explore the consequences of 
competition between microfinance institutions and the formal banking sector, 
examining initial bank lending response to exogenous MFI branch entry. I use data from 
a 2005-2009 study performed in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India by Abhijit Banerjee, 
Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster and Cynthia Kinnan. I examine formal banking 
outcomes, specifically bank loan take-up and bank loan amounts. The competitive 
interaction between MFIs and banks highlights issues surrounding MFI efficacy. Does 
microfinance increase the availability of loans or make it harder for people to borrow in 
aggregate? What happens to the percentage of people taking up bank loans and to the 
amount of those loans when an MFI enters? What characteristics make up credit-worthy 
clientele for a bank, and is there clientele overlap with MFIs? Broadly, I examine the 
following: what impact does MFI competition have on the banking sector and how do 
those consequences affect MFI and bank clientele? 
There are four competing hypotheses that frame my research. (1) When MFIs 
enter, banks change their lending behavior to target clientele with higher levels of 
income, which avoids competition consequences and diminishes their group of risky 
borrowers. This in turn creates a gap of people with too little income to get a bank loan 
and too high income to be targeted by an MFI. (2) When MFIs enter, banks directly 
compete with MFIs for riskier, high interest borrowers. (3) When MFIs enter, banks do 
not change their behavior as they observe that riskier clients can use MFI loans to 
finance bank loans. This complementarity creates a slight overlap in clientele and only 
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mild competition consequences. This is tangentially related to a crowding-in hypothesis 
summarized by Mookherjee and Motta (2016), which is described in the literature 
review. (4) Banks and MFIs operate in separate markets which do not overwhelmingly 
affect one another, and therefore MFI entry has little to no effect on banking 
characteristics.  
Previous papers generally examine MFI-bank interaction via panel data 
extracted from large datasets of MFI outreach and bank outreach over time across a 
multitude of different countries. The previous papers that examine this bank-MFI 
relationship have potential endogeneity issues. There are a number of factors, such as 
area income, which can determine whether MFIs choose to enter certain markets over 
others. These factors can also be explanatory factors in different outcome regressions, 
thus creating endogeneity and the possibility of bias. While this method has its obvious 
benefits in the robustness of data at hand, I look specifically at data from a study which 
exogenously determined MFI entry into market neighborhoods. I will see how my 
findings line up with those of other studies, as well as expand upon any complimentary 
findings presented in my data. Although my dataset lacks the depth and power of others, 
extrapolating from a controlled study allows me to look at initial bank response rather 
than overall relationship, which allows me to avoid biases related to endogeneity that 
previous papers may have experienced. 
I find MFI entry to have no causal effects on bank loan outcomes. I test this 
finding on a variety of area-specific characteristics that could contribute to a bank’s 
decision to compete or retreat in an area with MFI presence and find an overall zero 
effect. I build clientele characteristics for both banks and MFIs and perform t-tests to 
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determine if there are significantly different borrower characteristics. I find that bank 
borrowers tend to be significantly different from MFI borrowers. I hypothesize that 
banks and MFIs operate in two relatively different markets, as MFI entry does not 
differentially affect banking sector outcomes nor is there significant overlap in clientele. 
To describe the state of financial services in the developing world and describe 
the steps microfinance has taken to improve it, I offer background material on both 
global poverty and financial services amongst the poor followed by contextual 
information on microfinance and the state of the institution. I then describe my specific 
area of exploration followed by a literature review and information on my specific data 
source. I then give information on my methods followed by my results and a discussion 
that includes areas for further exploration. 
Finance and the Poor 
Global poverty has steadily decreased over the past few decades. However, 
hundreds of millions of people continue to live in poverty. Primarily, global poverty is 
concentrated in two geographic areas of the globe: Sub-Saharan Africa, that holds 
50.7% of the 766.6 million people living in absolute poverty, and South Asia, with 
33.4% of the absolute poor. In India, a 2015 census revealed that of the 219 million 
village households surveyed, less than 10% of households have a job that pays a salary, 
not even 5% have a high enough income to pay taxes, only 3.5% of students graduate 
high school, and over 35% of people are illiterate (Katyal, 2015).  
Financial services can offer numerous benefits to these communities. They 
tackle asymmetric information systems between service providers and clients and 
between individuals and financial structures; allow for greater and more efficient 
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investment, resource allocation and trade; facilitate greater economic choice; and enable 
risk mitigation amongst households and businesses (Peachey and Roe, 2006). Financial 
services have the potential to allow people to build up their businesses, incomes, and 
savings. However, the access to and usage of financial services in the developing world 
is uneven, and those living in poverty may need financial services even more than 
others. For example, savings accounts can control for the poor’s unsteady and irregular 
income stream that makes them seem unattractive to lenders, in turn helping them get 
loans in the future. 
A 2009 study by the Financial Access Initiative reported about 2.5 billion adults 
either lack or choose not to use existing formal financial services, with 2.2 billion of 
them living in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Further, over two thirds 
of the adults who do use those services in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East live under 
the $5 per day mark (Chaia et al., 2009). There is a semi-strong correlation between 
financial services usage and GDP per capita, although there are notable exceptions 
including areas in Southeast Asia (Chaia et al., 2009). Over 80% of households use 
financial services in some form in North America and Western Europe, compared to 
under 20% in sub-Saharan Africa. In rural India, although 40% have a deposit account, 
only 20% have active loans (Karlan and Morduch, 2009). In addition, household 
creditworthiness does not necessarily indicate their intent to borrow. A 2002 Indonesian 
study showed that while roughly 40% of the poor population was deemed credit worthy 
by a bank, only 10% borrowed. Of the households that were credit worthy but didn’t 
borrow, only 10% said it was because of lack of collateral (Johnston and Morduch, 
2008). This gap could very much be due to debt aversion. Loans also commonly come 
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from informal sources that lend with unfavorable terms. A 2007 study found that 52% 
of outstanding loans in Hyderabad came from informal money lenders (Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2007). 
Furthermore, practices of formal lenders suggest underserved populations within 
the realm of consumption-purpose loans. Formal banks mainly lend for entrepreneurial 
reasons while the informal and non-bank financial sectors many times provide loans for 
consumption and other individual purposes (Johnston and Morduch, 2007). Loan 
purpose could be a determinant towards borrowing source for poorer households who 
take up most of the informal credit sector and who contribute entirely to the industry 
that is striving to change the impoverished financial services market in the developing 
world – microfinance.  
Microfinance 
Microfinance is defined as “financial services, including credit, supplied in 
small allotments to people who might otherwise have no access to them or have access 
only on very unfavorable terms.” (Todaro and Smith, 2015) MFIs were developed to 
lend to women for entrepreneurship purposes, hoping to increase female decision 
power, status, and empowerment in impoverished communities. Many MFIs still only 
lend strictly to women, and many do still require their loans to be used for 
entrepreneurial reasons, however in many cases those guidelines have been relaxed. At 
the end of 2013 MFIs were reaching over 211 million borrowers worldwide 
(Microcredit Summit Campaign, 2015). The poorest clients made up over 114 million 
of those borrowers, however that number has been declining since 2010. Of those 
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poorest clients, between 82% and 83% were women (Microcredit Summit Campaign, 
2015).  
MFI structure differs across firms. MFIs can be either for profit and not for 
profit, but both operate to help their target clientele (MicroLoan Foundation, 2007). 
MFIs are similar to banks in structure, however they can differ in methodology, target 
clientele, funding sources and end goals. Informal moneylenders also differ, and 
although they play a major role in financial services in impoverished areas they are 
relatively unfavorable (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007).  
Information gathering is consistently shown to be the most difficult aspect 
concerning lending in the developing world. Because of the difficulty and time-
consuming nature of information gathering efforts, such as collecting client 
characteristics, the costs of lending can skyrocket. To combat these costs, most MFIs 
use joint liability lending, meaning loans are given to groups of individuals and every 
member is punished if one member defaults. These groups are usually formed by the 
clients themselves. These strategies eliminate much of the risk associated with lending 
to unknown entities. Many MFIs hold mandatory weekly group meetings which are also 
used as collection platforms for loan officers, which in turn cuts collection costs. 
Much of the research on MFIs surrounds their efficacy. The American Journal 
of Economics: Applied Economics published six different articles containing 
experiments performed across the globe in India, Morocco, Mexico, Ethiopia, Bosnia 
and Mongolia, testing the efficacy of MFI implementation via randomized 
experimentation (Banerjee et al., “Six Randomized Evaluations,” 2015). The studies 
found no evidence of significant changes in poverty levels or income and no evidence 
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of microfinance lifting communities out of poverty. However, the experiments did show 
some increases in choices relating to consumption and occupation, increases in female 
decision making power, increased risk management, and small yet significant increased 
business activity (Banerjee et al., “Six Randomized Evaluations,” 2015). Because 
transformative effects are apparent in some populations and not in others, both 
proponents and critics of microfinance can find evidence to back up their claims. 
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Area of Exploration 
This study looks at competition between MFIs and the formal banking sector, 
specifically examining the response of bank lending outcomes to MFI entrance. I 
empirically explore the change in the number of people with outstanding bank loans and 
the amount of those loans upon MFI entry. I examine differences in areas with MFI 
presence and areas without to look at differential effects. From this, I use empirics and 
theory to examine how banks behave in the midst of competition with MFIs and the 
definitive benefits and disadvantages of MFI-bank competition for both institutions and 
clients. I expect to see, upon MFI entry, banks target wealthier clientele and avoid 
competition, banks directly compete with MFIs for risker, higher interest borrowers, 
banks do not change their lending behavior upon MFI entry because they observe 
riskier clients finance bank loans with MFI loans, or banks operate in a completely 
different market space and are unchanged by MFI entry. 
Literature Review 
There has been much discussion on competition between MFIs, and direct MFI-
MFI consequences can be seen through real world scenarios. The Bangladesh 
microfinance crisis involved the growth of Grameen Bank, ASA, BRAC and Proshika, 
four competing MFIs. Throughout the 1990s there was a boom in MFI borrowers 
coupled with a percentage of borrowers with outstanding loans from multiple sources. 
By the end of the ‘90s, multiple MFIs appeared in over 95% of surveyed villages across 
Bangladesh, and reports showed that 15% of borrowers had loans from multiple MFIs. 
Grameen Bank’s repayment rates fell by almost ten percentage points (Armendariz and 
Morduch, 2010). A similar scenario played out in Bolivia as well (Armendariz and 
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Morduch, 2010). Although an MFI might make a rule that a client with an outstanding 
loan elsewhere cannot continue to borrow, the methods of knowing that information are 
extremely costly and inadequate as there is relatively little information sharing across 
the entirety of financial services. Credit bureaus are many times discussed as ways to 
increase cooperative practices, and although the idea is nice in theory, many would find 
it difficult to adequately operate credit bureaus in areas like Bangladesh (Armendariz 
and Morduch, 2010). Theoretically, these or related consequences could be experienced 
via bank-MFI competition. 
Mookherjee and Motta (2016) analyze interactions between informal money 
lenders and MFIs that can be theorized onto a bank-MFI competition model. 
Mookherjee and Motta describe the failure of MFI presence to mitigate overbearing 
informal lender interest rates, listing many possible explanations previously put forth, 
including the crowding in effect. Crowding in occurs because MFIs create an inflexible 
repayment atmosphere that in turn increases informal loan demand to repay MFI loans. 
As borrowers increase their amounts of unpaid loans and add to their debt, default risks 
increase along with more frequent informal borrowing, a consequence MFIs were 
created to alleviate. This theory can still be superimposed to the banking sector. 
Although the formal banking sector has similarly inflexible repayment schedules, a 
comparable crowding-in scenario could be at play. Assuming there is some overlap in 
bank and MFI clientele, MFI entry could allow borrowers to finance bank loans with 
MFI loans. This would create a greater demand for both MFI loans and bank loans and 
cause larger debt pools for overlapping clients and therefore increase the risk of default 
and other consequences of overborrowing.  
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Research done on MFI-bank interaction concludes that competition exists, 
however there is disagreement on how. Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch (2013) 
researched the effect bank competition has on MFI performance. They look at panel 
data extracted from datasets on bank outreach and MFI performance. They observe that 
bank entry pushes MFIs to focus on smaller loans to poorer clientele. They also find 
MFIs show greater outreach when faced with higher and more concentrated bank 
competition. However, Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013) come to the opposite 
conclusion: in areas with less-developed formal banking sectors, MFI outreach is 
greater, and in areas with more developed formal banking sectors, MFIs and banks 
compete for the same riskier clients. They also conclude that in areas with developed 
formal banking sectors, MFIs give smaller loan amounts when competing with banks, 
suggesting MFIs target poorer clients when faced with large banking sector 
competition.  
Maksudova (2010) finds that bank-MFI competition consequences are 
dependent upon the income level of the countries in which the institutions operate. The 
data suggests that low income countries have relatively low financial integration 
between MFIs and other sources of financial services. Low financial integration implies 
that an increase in MFI loans does not necessarily produce an increase or a decrease in 
bank loans, as the sectors are relatively separated. Maksudova finds that the research 
roughly corresponds with the market failure hypothesis that MFIs work through “filling 
in the gaps” of formal banking. Vanroose and D’Espellier (2013) find this as well, 
concluding that MFIs can be viewed as “substitutes” for banks. Substitution means that 
an increase in MFI loans leads to a decrease in bank loans.  
 11 
 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch (2013) also conclude that MFIs that are 
commercially funded, offer individual instead of joint liability loans, or take deposits 
will be more greatly affected by competition than other types of MFIs. Vanroose and 
D’Espallier (2013) also find institutional characteristics such as age, size, and legal 
status of the MFI influence MFI-bank competition.  
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch (2013) do not find that bank competition 
negatively affects overall MFI financial performance, however they conclude that 
financial performance for MFIs with urban clientele that geographically overlap with 
bank branches is negatively affected. They hypothesize that MFIs cannot adequately use 
the incentive of future loan denial when there is stronger bank presence, or that MFIs 
may simply not be able to compete with larger banks when it comes to the services 
provided and the prices charged.  
The research shows that competition consequences are present on an aggregated 
scale. Differences in country income, MFI institutional characteristics, and level of 
formal banking sector development all contribute to level of competition between banks 
and MFIs. The literature suggests competition exists between the two sectors, which 
would imply that competition would be present in my study. However, the competition 
being picked up in these studies is on a more aggregated scale than that of the data with 
which I work, so even though competition is seen on a larger, cross-country and cross-
institutional scale, it is not necessarily true that finding no competition in this study 
would produce a contradictory result to what others have found. 
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Data 
I use data from the paper The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a 
Randomized Evaluation by Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster and 
Cynthia Kinnan. The data was downloaded from the American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics. Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and Kinnan partnered with Spandana, 
an MFI in India, to test MFI efficacy within a randomized controlled study in 
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India. 104 neighborhoods deemed “poor” and that lacked 
prior-MFI presence were chosen, and 52 of the 104 were randomly assigned as areas to 
open a new branch of Spandana. Those areas were marked as ‘treatment’ areas, while 
the other 52 were ‘control’ areas and did not experience Spandana branch entry 
throughout the study. The researchers tracked lender, borrower, and area characteristics 
throughout baseline, measured in 2005, endline1 measured 15-18 months after baseline, 
and endline2, which was measured two years after endline1 and showed longer-term 
treatment differences, even though by endline2 there was some MFI lending in control 
areas.  
Overall, the study found that while there were some significant changes with 
MFI entry, MFI entry did not result in enormous changes in poverty levels. They found 
that business activity, including investment and profits, significantly increased, however 
many variables such as health and education were left unchanged by MFI entry. The 
composition of expenditures was changed, as durable good expenditures increased 
while expenditures on ‘temptation goods’ decreased. Consumption was not significantly 
changed. By endline2, many of the significant differences reported in endline1 became 
insignificant, suggesting the areas that had definite MFI access for much longer were 
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not significantly different from the control areas that did not have MFI access or only 
received access to MFI loans relatively recently.  
Spandana is a for-profit MFI, however during the time of this experiment all 
profits were cycled back into the business. Spandana is a strict joint liability lender, and 
groups are formed by the clients themselves. Eligibility for Spandana loans falls into 
four categories: borrowers must be female, between the ages of 18 and 59, reside in the 
same “area” for the span of at least a year with proof of residence and valid ID, and 
80% of each group needs to consist of women who own their home (Banerjee et al., 
“The Miracle of Microfinance?” 2015). Loans do not have to be for entrepreneurial 
purposes. Spandana’s interest rates are relatively low compared to other MFIs, however 
specific rates were not discussed in this experiment.  
This dataset has multiple shortcomings. There are a multitude of borrower 
characteristics that were not measured at baseline or not given in either baseline or 
endline datasets, such as baseline household income, neighborhood proximity to one 
another, and type of business operations. Also, interest rate information is absent, so I 
cannot explore the relationship between Spandana’s and surrounding bank’s interest 
rates and the effects of MFI entry on bank’s interest rates. Characteristics of the banking 
sector in Hyderabad are not made readily available in this dataset or in others. Because 
of this, I cannot compare specific banking sector industry characteristics, or even firm 
level characteristics, to firm level MFI characteristics. The main shortcoming of this 
data set, however, is that it is cross sectional data and not panel data, as the panel data 
does not exist. The major consequence of having to work with cross sectional data in a 
setting like this is the lack of power. The benefit of using this dataset over other, 
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aggregated panel datasets is that the experiment was set up in such a way that allows for 
MFI-entry to be examined exogenously instead of the general endogeneity of entry 
variables, therefore ensuring unbiased estimates.  
Table 1 shows how loan likelihood and loan amount for banks, MFIs, the 
informal credit sector, and all loans change across baseline, endline1, and endline2. All 
amounts are in rupees, while the loan likelihoods are in percentage points.  
Table 1: Dependent Variable Means Across Measurement Periods 
VARIABLES Baseline   Endline1 Endline2 
    
Bank 0.0387 0.0816 0.0736 
 (0.193) (0.274) (0.261) 
Bank Amount 4694.693 8755.339 5683.892 
 (115873.4) (83107.43) (35692.4) 
MFI 0.0157 0.2374 0.3409 
 (0.124) (0.426) (0.474) 
MFI Amount 303.8724 3204.176 6136.486 
 (4580.333) (7414.078) (12547.23) 
Informal 0.6278 0.7337 0.6032 
 (0.483) (0.442) (0.489) 
Informal Amount 27075.4 40725.36 32452.63 
 (64573.6) (86804.74) (80551.54) 
Any Loan 0.6762 0.8576 0.9052 
 (0.468) (0.349) (0.293) 
Any Loan Amount 33701.57 62062.73 90927.75 
 (137417.9) (173419.8) (149981.7) 
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Methodology 
I use regression analysis to analyze how bank outcomes differentially respond to 
MFI entry in treatment and control areas. I look at bank loan take-up and amount of 
bank loans and how those variables change with MFI entry between baseline and 
endline1 as well as between baseline and endline2. I expect to see some form of 
differential effects on bank loans between the treatment and control areas, as I expect 
there to be competition consequences from MFI entry on the banking sector. I perform a 
specific type of treatment analysis called Differences in Differences, or DiD, to look at 
the interaction between banks and MFIs. In the simplest form, the regressions look as 
follows.  (1) 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀 (2) 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏_𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀 
The outcome variable 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 refers to bank loan likelihood. 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is equal to 1 if an 
individual has a bank loan and equal to 0 if the individual does not. The outcome 
variable 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏_𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 refers to the amount of each bank loan. The subscripts 𝑒𝑒,𝑏𝑏, and 𝑡𝑡 
represent individual 𝑒𝑒, area 𝑏𝑏, and time-period (baseline, endline1, or endline2) 𝑡𝑡. Each 
area refers to each of the 104 neighborhoods in the study. The 𝑋𝑋 represents a multitude 
of control variables put into the regressions. The variable 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01 is a binary 
variable equal to zero if the observation is from baseline and equal to 1 if the 
observation is from endline1. The variable 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 is a binary variable equal to 0 if 
the neighborhood was a control area, and therefore did not have MFI entry, and equal to 
1 if the neighborhood was part of the treatment. The interaction term 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01 ∗
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𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 reflects the differences from baseline to endline1 between treatment and 
control areas. The coefficient associated with this interaction term, 𝛽𝛽3, is my DiD 
estimator and my main coefficient of interest in both regressions. I include area fixed 
effects in each regression, 𝛼𝛼, to account for area-level differences. I then perform these 
same regressions, replacing 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01 with 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒02, a binary variable equal to zero 
if the observation is from baseline and equal to 1 if the observation is from endline2, to 
look at longer-run differences from baseline to endline2 and compare the direction and 
magnitude of the effects experienced at endline1.  
It is possible that a bank’s decision to compete with an MFI is dependent upon 
area-level characteristics. This would mean that treatment areas with high values of 
certain area-specific characteristics would have differential bank outcomes as compared 
to control areas. For example, banks could be competing with MFIs in high literacy 
areas but not competing in low literacy ones. To examine this, I use five area-specific 
variables, or value indicators, measured at baseline – previous banking in the area, total 
area expenditures, total area debt, total number of businesses in the area, and area 
literacy rate. I use these five as they were all measured at baseline and theoretically 
would contribute to the credit worthiness of each area.  
I create two distinct binary variables for each value indicator and in turn perform 
triple difference analyses on each of the binary variables. This is to say I look at the 
differences from baseline to endline1 or endline2, between treatment and control areas, 
between areas above or below the value indicator of interest. I create two binaries for 
each value indicator so I can examine robustness of findings. Areas at or above cutoffs 
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are deemed “high value” areas. Table 2 shows the distinct cutoffs for each value 
indicator.  
Table 2: Value Indicator Variable Cutoffs 
   
Value Indicator Cutoff Value 
   
Already Banked 1 1 
 2 2 
Expenditures  50% 998.3371 
 75% 1095.726 
Debt 50% 34122.68 
 75% 38675 
Businesses 50% 7.24966 
 75% 11 
Literacy 50% 0.6823932 
 75% 0.7478261 
All value indicators besides debt are designed as follows: if the area value indicator is 
at or above the cutoff, then the value indicator is equal to 1. Otherwise, it is equal to 0. 
Debt is set up in the opposite way – if area debt is below the cutoff, debt is equal to 1. 
Otherwise, it is equal to 0. A ‘high value debt area’ still refers to an area with average 
total debt above the cutoff.  
The first value indicator is 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎_𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 which indicates if an area had banking 
sector presence at baseline. I use previous banking to proxy for financial sector 
integration that Cull et al. (2013) and Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013) found to be a 
determinant for competition. I say that if someone in the area has an outstanding bank 
loan at baseline then the area is already banked. The second cutoff is if at least two 
people in an area have an outstanding bank loan at baseline. This is a practical proxy for 
previous banking as long as borrowers obtain financing from branches or lenders in 
their own neighborhoods. The other four value indicators have cutoffs based on the 
mean and upper quartile values. The value indicator 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒 is the area monthly 
expenditures at baseline, which I use as a proxy for income. The value indicator 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 is 
the area’s total debt at baseline. The value indicator 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏 is the total number of 
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businesses in an area at baseline. The value indicator 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 is the literacy rate of each area 
at baseline.  
I run four main regressions for each threshold, and then repeat the regressions 
replacing 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01 with 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒02 and replacing 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 with 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏_𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡. The 
regressions look as follows: (3) 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01𝑖𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖ℎ_𝑣𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀 (4) 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01𝑖𝑖
∗ ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖ℎ_𝑣𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖ℎ_𝑣𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽6𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01𝑖𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖ℎ_𝑣𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖
∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀 (5) 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01𝑖𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖ℎ_𝑣𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+ 𝜀𝜀 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 = 1 (6) 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01𝑖𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖ℎ_𝑣𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+ 𝜀𝜀 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 = 0 
The ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖ℎ_𝑣𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒 variable is a place holder for each of the ten value indicators described 
above (five types, two cutoffs per type). Regression (3) allows me to look at differences 
in banking across endlines between high and low value areas to see if and how the 
banking sector is dependent on each area characteristic. Regression (4) is the triple 
difference regression, which shows differences between treatment and control areas 
across endlines, dependent on different value indicators. This tells me if the banking 
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sector’s response to MFI entry differs for high and low value areas. Regressions (5) and 
(6) show how banking responds to these different value indicators within treatment and 
control areas separately. There are multiple cases where the triple difference regression 
coefficients are insignificant but there are significant coefficients within one or both of 
the treatment and control samples.  
By looking at differences across both baseline to endline1 and baseline to 
endline2 I can see the robustness of the results across time and look to see what effects, 
if any, are being picked up only in the short run or only in the long run. I also look at 
the robustness of the results by using two different cutoffs, the second of which would 
be assumed to be a stricter cut as less areas are considered high value. 
To gain a complete picture of the effects of the interaction, I look at similar 
outcomes in both the MFI sector and the informal credit sector, specifically looking at 
differences in treatment and control areas with respect to the value indicators. I examine 
the two treatment effect regressions, (1) and (2), while replacing the dependent 
variables with 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒_𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒, and 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒_𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡. I then replace 
𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒01 with 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒02 to look at long term effects. To conclude these sector 
analyses, I run regressions (4) (5) and (6) with the new dependent variables, however I 
only use the first cutoff of each value indicator and I only look across endline1 as 
robustness in these sectors is not the focus of this study. The purposes of looking at the 
informal sector and the MFI sector are to see how the outcomes of those sectors 
compare to the outcomes of the banking sector and, more importantly, to use these 
analyses to examine possible theories as to why banking behavior responds to MFI 
entry the way it does. 
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Finally, I examine characteristics that determine bank and MFI loan take-up to 
look at differences in clientele. This analysis shows how separate the markets are for 
banks and MFIs. All characteristic analysis is done only on endline1 and endline2 as 
baseline data on the individual level cannot be matched with endline data on the 
individual level. I also run the same characteristics through a regression only on the 
dependent variable 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏, using only the sample of people that borrow from either an 
MFI or a bank. Any statistically significant coefficients produced from this regression 
are statistical differences between clientele characteristics for banks and for MFIs.  
I then build a table of means that displays what the average value is for each 
clientele characteristic when the borrower has borrowed from a bank and the borrower 
has borrowed from an MFI. In this table, I present t-statistics that show if there are 
statistically significant differences between the average values for both samples. This 
shows me whether each characteristic is significantly different between bank and MFI 
clientele, and allows me to conclude whether bank and MFI clientele are statistically 
different from one another. This analysis allows me to hypothesize more directly as to 
whether banks and MFIs operate in significantly different marketspaces. 
Variables on the household level are household size, whether the head of the 
household is male, the age of the head, whether the head has education, whether the 
household owned a business at least one year before endline1, and whether the 
household owns land. Area specific variables taken into consideration are area 
populations at baseline, whether an area has high or low business activity at baseline, 
whether an area has high or low expenditures at baseline, whether an area has a high or 
low literacy rate at baseline, and whether an area had previous banking at baseline. All 
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area variables that are used here that were used above are based on the mean variable 
threshold. Lastly, indexes used in the original study on women employment, income, 
labor, consumption, and social factors are taken into consideration.  
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Results 
Banking Sector 
Table 3: Summary of Banking Sector Treatment Differences 
    
 
VARIABLES 
Baseline to 
Endline (1,2) 
Bank 
(1) 
Bank Amount 
(2) 
Endline (𝛽𝛽2) 1 0.0401*** 1,002 
  (0.00876) (3,307) 
 2 0.0360*** -1,030 
  (0.00867) (2,588) 
Endline*Treatment (𝛽𝛽3) 1 0.000904 5,035 
  (0.0123) (4,631) 
 2 -0.00906 3,216 
  (0.0120) (3,573) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
I find no impacts of MFI entry on banking usage. This can be seen in tables 5 
and 6 as well as table 3 above which summarizes key estimates from tables 5 and 6. 
There is an increase in bank loan take-up between baseline and endline1 of 4.01 
percentage points, however there are no statistically significant differences between 
treatment and non-treatment areas when it comes to bank loan take-up between baseline 
and endline1. There are also no significant effects on bank loan amounts between 
baseline and endline1 as well as no significant differences between treatment and 
control areas. While there is a 3.6 percentage point increase in bank loans between 
baseline and endline2, there are again no significant differences between treatment and 
non-treatment areas when it comes to the number of people with bank loans between 
baseline and endline2, consistent with the results from the baseline-endline1 regression. 
There are also no significant increases in bank loan amount between baseline and 
endline2, nor are there significant differences in bank loan amount between treatment 
and control areas. 
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To study whether this result masks heterogenous treatment effects, I turn to the 
five value indicators that could detriment whether banks choose to compete in specific 
treatment areas. All results are reported in tables 7-17. All trends are described between 
baseline and endline1. Endline2 is only discussed if there are drastic differences in 
effects. Overall, I do not find differential effects between treatment and control areas 
across endlines when looking at high value or low value areas. I do find some 
differential effects on bank loan take-up and bank loan amount between high value and 
low value areas regardless of treatment, and I do find differences between high and low 
value areas within only treatment or only control areas. Table 4 shows a summary of 
results from the mean-cutoff regression with each value indicator between baseline and 
endline1. 
Table 4: Summary of Key Mean-Cutoff Value Indicator Variable Coefficients 
     
 
 
VALUE 
INDICATOR 
 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
High_Value* 
Endline01* 
Treatment 
(1) 
High_Value* 
Endline01 
(Treatment) 
(2) 
High_Value* 
Endline01 
(Control) 
 (3) 
     
Already Banked Bank 0.0103 -0.0550*** -0.0659*** 
  (0.0238) (0.0143) (0.0193) 
 Bank Amount 16,773 -2,156 -19,012* 
  (10,374) (2,835) (10,116) 
Expenditures  Bank -0.0123 -0.00288 0.0104 
  (0.0259) (0.0167) (0.0201) 
 Bank Amount 3,804 3,537 -1,565 
  (10,009) (3,124) (9,532) 
Debt Bank -0.0157 0.00922 0.0245 
  (0.0238) (0.0163) (0.0176) 
 Bank Amount -12,897 4,599 17,766 
  (12,358) (3,100) (12,049) 
Businesses Bank 0.0256 0.00254 -0.0238 
  (0.0264) (0.0179) (0.0195) 
 Bank Amount -18,200* -4,481 13,169 
  (10,230) (2,895) (9,594) 
Literacy Bank -0.0305 0.0296** 0.0609*** 
  (0.0235) (0.0145) (0.0186) 
 Bank Amount 592.7 3,211 2,299 
  (11,230) (2,721) (10,828) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Previous Banking 
Borrowing in previously unbanked areas, i.e. areas with at least one person who 
had an outstanding bank loan at baseline, appears to play catch-up to and sometimes 
surpass borrowing in previously banked areas. All results for the already banked 
indicator are reported in tables 7 and 8. Areas that were banked at baseline are slightly 
more likely to have a bank loan at endline1 than baseline, but are 5.99 percentage points 
less likely to have a bank loan at endline1 than those in previously unbanked areas, 
significant at the 1% level. Using the second cutoff of already banked, i.e. at least two 
people who had outstanding bank loans at baseline, the likelihood that people in 
previously banked areas have a bank loan decreases between baseline and endline1 by 
0.17 percentage. The difference in bank loan take-up at endline1 between previously 
banked and unbanked areas is similar to yet slightly smaller than that of the first cutoff.  
While there are differences between previously banked and unbanked areas, 
there are no significant differential effects of previous banking on bank loans between 
treatment and control areas. Within treatment areas, people in already banked areas are 
5.50 percentage points less likely to have a bank loan at endline1 than people in 
previously unbanked areas. Within control areas, people in areas that were previously 
banked are 6.59 percentage points less likely to have an outstanding bank loan at 
endline1 than people in areas that were previously unbanked. All results are significant 
at the 1% level. The second cutoff produces similar results, with the difference in bank 
loan take-up within treatment areas becoming slightly larger while said difference 
within control areas becomes slightly smaller and is significant at the 5% level. 
Although there are significant differences within treatment and within control areas, the 
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effects are of similar direction and magnitude which explains the insignificant 
coefficients in the triple interaction. 
There are significant effects on bank loan amounts. People in already banked 
areas see a decline in average bank loan amounts between baseline and endline1 by a 
factor of 10,610 Rs. in comparison to areas that were previously unbanked, significant 
at the 5% level. This difference is so large that people in previously banked areas see a 
decrease in bank loan amount while people in previously unbanked areas experience an 
increase between baseline and endline1. Using the second cutoff, this effect becomes 
insignificant.  
There are no significant effects on bank loan amount for the triple interaction 
nor within treatment areas. Within control areas, people in previously banked areas have 
smaller bank loan amounts than their previously unbanked counterparts by 19012 Rs. at 
endline1, significant at the 10% level. Again, this difference is large enough that people 
in control and previously banked areas experience a decline in bank loan amounts 
between baseline and endline1 while those in control and previously unbanked areas 
experience an increase. Effects become insignificant at endline2 when using the second 
cutoff.  
Business Activity 
All results for the business indicator are in tables 9 and 10. High value business 
areas have no significant differential effects on bank loan take-up across endlines, 
regardless of cutoff. There are also no significant differential effects between treatment 
and control areas, nor are there significant effects within either sample of treatment 
areas or control areas. 
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There are significant effects on bank loan amounts. The triple interaction 
regression concerning treatment, endlines, and high value business areas is significant. 
For high value business areas, treatment areas have on average bank loans that are 
18200.06 Rs. less than those in control areas at endline1, using the first business cutoff. 
The second cutoff produces a slightly larger difference. Both of these results are 
significant at the 10% level. This result becomes insignificant when looking at endline2.  
Using the second business cutoff, there are significant estimates within the 
treatment sample. People in high value business treatment areas have smaller bank 
loans at endline1 by 6015 Rs. than those in low value business treatment areas, 
significant at the 10% level. There are no significant estimates for treatment areas using 
the first cutoff nor are there significant estimates for control areas.  
Debt 
All results for the debt indicator are in tables 11 and 12. There are no significant 
differential effects of either debt variable on bank loan take-up across baseline and 
endline1. There are no significant effects of high value debt areas on bank loan take-up 
between treatment and control areas across endlines, nor are there significant 
differences in bank loan take-up within the treatment sample nor within the control 
sample.  
There are no significant differential effects of high value debt areas on bank loan 
amounts between treatment and control areas. There are no significant effects within 
control areas nor within treatment areas at endline1. However, there are some 
significant estimates. People in low value debt areas on average have bank loan 
amounts at endline1 that are 11479 Rs. larger than those in high value debt areas, 
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significant at the 10% level when using the first debt cutoff. This result is insignificant 
when looking at endline2 or when using the second debt cutoff. However, using both 
debt cutoffs at endline2, low value debt treatment areas are shown to have larger bank 
loan amounts than high value debt treatment areas, significant at the 10% level. The 
second cutoff produces a slightly larger difference than the first.  
Expenditures 
All results for the expenditure indicator are reported in tables 13 and 14. I find 
no significant differences in bank loan take-up or bank loan amount between high and 
low value expenditure areas. There are no significant differential effects of high value 
expenditure areas between treatment and control areas. There are also no differential 
effects of high and low expenditures on bank loan take-up or bank loan amount within 
treatment areas nor within control areas. These trends are true for both cutoffs.  
Literacy Rates 
All results for the literacy indicator are in tables 15 and 16. People in high value 
literacy areas are 4.49 percentage points more likely to have a bank loan at endline1 
than those in low value literacy areas, using the first cutoff. The triple interaction term 
is not significant between baseline and endline1. However, between baseline and 
endline2 the triple difference estimate is significant for both literacy cutoffs. At endline 
2, high value literacy treatment areas are 4.13 or 5.38 percentage points less likely to 
have a bank loan relative to high value literacy control areas, respective to each cutoff. 
The first cutoff is significant at the 10% level while the second cutoff is significant at 
5%. 
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Those in high value literacy treatment areas are 2.96 percentage points more 
likely to have a bank loan at endline1 than those in low value literacy treatment areas, 
significant at the 5% level, using only the first cutoff. Those in high value literacy 
control areas are 6.09 percentage points more likely to have a bank loan than those in 
low value literacy control areas at endline1, significant at the 1% level. The second 
literacy cutoff produces a similar yet slightly smaller difference. There are no 
significant effects of high value literacy areas on bank loan amounts, nor are there 
significant differential effects of literacy on bank loan amounts between treatment and 
control areas nor within either sample of treatment or control areas.  
Informal and MFI sectors 
I examine informal loans and MFI loans to get a sense of how treatment affected 
these types of loans and to compare effects against bank loans. As neither informal 
sector effects nor MFI sector effects are the focus of this study, I do not check effects as 
extensively as with the banking sector. I do not show the results against endline2 or 
against the second cutoff for each value indicator. Only the triple difference coefficients 
are reported in the tables, however I do explain some within-sample trends that, while 
not affecting the banking sector, are interesting to note. 
Informal 
Tables 18 and 19 show results for the informal credit sector. There are 
significant increases in informal loan take-up and informal loan amount between 
baseline and endline1. There is a significant decrease in informal loan take-up at 
endline2, while the estimate for bank loan amount at endline2 is insignificant. There are 
no significant differences between treatment and control areas when it comes to 
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informal loan take-up and informal loan amounts between baseline and endline1. There 
also exist no significant differences between treatment and control areas when it comes 
to previous banking, high value expenditure areas, high value business areas, high value 
debt areas, or high value literacy areas. There are also no significant differences within 
treatment areas nor within control areas when it comes to previously banking, high 
value expenditure areas, or high value literacy areas.  
In treatment areas, people in high value business areas experience smaller 
amounts of informal loans as compared to their low value business area counterparts at 
endline1. This effect is insignificant in control areas. There is also no significant effect 
on informal loan take-up in neither treatment nor control areas with respect to high 
value business areas. 
People in low value debt control areas have a higher likelihood of having an 
informal loan at endline1 as compared to their high value debt control area counterparts. 
There is no such significant difference for treatment areas. People in low value debt 
areas experience significantly larger informal loans than those in high value debt areas 
at endline1 in both samples of treatment and control areas.  
MFI 
Tables 20 and 21 show results for the MFI sector. There are significant positive 
effects on the number of people with MFI loans between baseline and endline1 as well 
as the amount of those MFI loans. There are positive differential effects between 
treatment and control areas, as treatment areas have much higher loan take-up and loan 
amounts. All effects become insignificant at endline2.  
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There are no significant differential effects for either MFI loan take-up or 
amount between treatment and control areas when it comes to previous banking, high 
value expenditure areas, high value business areas, or high value literacy areas. There 
are also no significant differences in loan take-up or loan amount within treatment nor 
within control areas between previously banked or unbanked areas, high or low 
expenditure areas, or high or low literacy areas. High value business areas are 8.19 
percentage points less likely to have MFI loans than those in low value business areas at 
endline1. No such significant effects appear in control areas, nor when it comes to bank 
loan amount.  
The only significant triple interactions come from the debt variable. People in 
low value debt treatment areas are 12.03 percentage points more likely to have an MFI 
loan than those in low value debt control areas. People in low value debt treatment areas 
also experience larger MFI loan amounts than those in low value debt control areas. 
Within treatment areas, people in low value debt areas are 11.95 percentage points more 
likely to have an MFI loan than those in high value debt areas. They also have higher 
loan amounts than those in high value debt areas. All estimates for control areas are 
insignificant. 
Characteristics of MFI and Bank loan take-up 
I examine whether banks and MFIs loan to individuals based on characteristics 
measured in the study. I look at how those characteristics compare to one another in the 
two different sectors. I then examine the means of all characteristics for both banks and 
MFIs, and test for statistical differences between means. I find there are multiple 
characteristics significant in one group and not the other. I also find many statistically 
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different means between groups of borrowers, suggesting strong differences in clientele 
between banks and MFIs. 
Significant Borrower Characteristics 
Both borrower characteristic regression results for endlines1 and 2 combined 
can be seen in table 22. Statistically significant banking characteristics are as follows: 
household size, the age of the head of the household, the household owning a business 
well before endline1, high area literacy, the household owning land, the income index, 
the consumption index, the social index, and the area being already banked at baseline 
all contribute positively to the likelihood of having a bank loan. The head having no 
education, the women employment index, and the labor index all contribute negatively 
to the likelihood of having a bank loan. 
Statistically significant MFI characteristics are as follows: household size, the 
household owning a business well before endline1, the women employment index, the 
labor index, the consumption index, and the social index all contribute positively to the 
likelihood of having an MFI loan. The age of the head of the household contributes 
negatively to the likelihood of having an MFI loan.  
Household size contributes about twice as much to bank loan take-up than to 
MFI loan take-up, as an increase in household size leads to 3.93 percentage point 
greater likelihood that a person has a bank loan, relative to the 1.27 percentage point 
greater likelihood that a person has an MFI loan. The age of the head of the household 
contributes more to MFI loan take-up than to bank loan take-up, as a one-year increase 
in the head’s age leads to a 0.0798 percentage point increase in bank loan take-up while 
it leads to a 0.251 percentage point decrease in MFI loan take-up. A household that has 
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an old business at least one year before endline1 is 1.6 percentage points more likely to 
have a bank loan, while they are 8.07 percentage points more likely to have an MFI 
loan. An increase in the women employment index leads to a decrease in bank loan 
take-up by 1.15 percentage points, while it leads to an increase in MFI loan take-up by 
3.97 percentage points and is much more significant. The labor index is similar in that 
an increase leads to a decrease in bank loan take-up by 1.57 percentage points while it 
leads to an increase in MFI loan take-up by 9.81 percentage points. The consumption 
index has a positive relation to both bank and MFI loan take-up, with an increase 
leading to a 4.7 percentage point increase for the banking sector and a 1.41 percentage 
point increase in the MFI sector. The social index also contributes positively to both 
sectors’ loan take-up, with a one unit increase leading to a 2.71 percentage point 
increase in the banking sector and a 4.23 percentage point increase for MFI loans.  
There are changes between endline1 and endline2. Concerning banking 
characteristics, the education of the head, owning an old business, literacy rates, and the 
social index all become insignificant at endline2 while they are significant at endline1. 
Being already banked at baseline is the only significant estimate in endline2 that is not 
significant at endline1. Concerning MFI characteristics, having a male head, being 
already banked at baseline, and the social index are all significant at endline1 but not 
significant at endline2. The consumption index is the only significant estimate for 
endline2 that is not significant at endline1.  
Significant Differences in Borrower Characteristics 
I run the same regression on bank likelihood as before, however I restrict the 
sample to only people who have outstanding bank or MFI loans at endline1 or endline2. 
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All results for this regression can be seen in table 23. This regression does produce 
multiple statistically significant estimates. The age of the head, area literacy rate, the 
women employment index, and the labor index are all statistically significant and 
positive. The head having no education, owning land well before endline1, and the 
income index are all statistically significant and negative. This means all these 
coefficients are statistically different for banks and for MFIs.  The p-value for the 
regression’s f-statistic is 0.00 which allows me to conclude the coefficients are jointly 
significant and different. 
The means of the variables show there are statistically different average values 
for many of the coefficients between bank borrowers and MFI borrowers. The table of 
means and related t-statistics can be seen in table 24. Many of the coefficients that were 
insignificant in the characteristic build up are significantly different from one another 
between bank and MFI clientele. In fact, ten out of sixteen variables have significantly 
different means between bank and MFI clientele. Male head, head age, head no 
education, area population, literacy, own land, women employment index, income 
index, labor index, and consumption index are all statistically different. This shows 
there is a greater separation in clientele pools than the initial characteristic regressions 
suggest. 
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Discussion  
Overall, there is little evidence of any effects of MFI entry on banking 
characteristics. The lack of treatment differences in the banking sector shows that 
banking characteristics are not affected by MFI competition, as bank loan take-up and 
bank loan amounts are not statistically different between treatment and control areas.  
Examining the five area-specific value indicator variables – already banked, 
expenditures, debt, total businesses, and literacy rates – allows for a more specific 
analysis of MFI-bank competition. Banks could be operating differently dependent on 
these specific neighborhood characteristics. However, the only statistically significant 
difference in bank loan take-up between treatment and control areas is for high value 
literacy areas at endline2, significant at both literacy cutoffs. People in high value 
literacy treatment areas are less likely on average to have bank loans. The only 
statistically significant difference in bank loan amounts between treatment and control 
areas is at endline1 with concern to high value business areas, significant at both 
business cutoffs. People in high value business treatment areas have on average smaller 
bank loans.  
 If anything, the effects that are statistically significant suggest a possible 
substitution effect between MFI loans and bank loans. This substitution effect agrees 
with Maksudova (2010) and Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013). Both value indicators 
that produce statistically significant triple difference estimates produce negative 
coefficients, meaning people in areas with MFI presence are either less likely to borrow 
from banks or have smaller bank loan amounts than control area counterparts.  
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Results from the business value indicator suggests that businesses could be 
substituting portions of their bank loans with MFI loans, causing areas with many 
businesses to have on average bank loan amounts that are less than those in control 
areas. Results from the literacy value indicator could suggest that, as literacy and 
education level are correlated, borrowers in high literacy areas have more education 
surrounding financial services, or are at least more able to educate themselves on 
financial services, and in turn find themselves more capable of crossing the barriers to 
borrow from new sources. Results could also have to do with differences in lending 
type between MFIs and banks. As Spandana is a strict joint liability lender, it could be 
that those in higher literacy or higher business activity areas find it more appealing to 
pool their risk and operate in a joint liability format.  
However, it is important to note the specificity required to achieve these 
significant coefficients. Only when combining a specific endline measurement with a 
specific value indicator is there a statistically significant result. This only happens in 
four out of forty instances tested: both business cutoffs at endline1 on bank loan amount 
and both literacy cutoffs at endline2 on bank loan take-up. The lack of robust results 
suggests that, while these specific significant differences should not be ignored, an 
overall zero effect of MFI competition on banking characteristics is witnessed.  
There do exist differences in high value indicator areas that appear within 
treatment or within control areas only, however most triple differences are insignificant. 
This most likely means the significant effects in one sample are being matched by 
similar effects, significant or not, within the other sample. For instance, there are no 
significant differences on bank loan take-up between treatment and control areas with 
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respect to previously banked and unbanked areas. However, there are significant 
differences between previously banked and unbanked areas within treatment areas as 
well as within control areas. In both samples, those in previously banked areas are less 
likely to have a bank loan at endline1 than their previously unbanked area counterparts 
at endline1. Because this effect is witnessed in both samples, there is no statistically 
significant estimate for differences between the two samples. This can also happen 
when only one sample has a statistically significant coefficient, as directional similarity 
and significance level can contribute to no statistically significant triple difference 
estimates. Because differences between treatment and control areas are what are being 
tested in this study, differences within samples, while interesting, do not contribute to 
whether banks act differently with MFI presence and are not discussed in more depth.  
 Although differences between treatment and control areas are not witnessed, 
there exists a massive increase in lending throughout the period, seen in Table 1. MFI 
loan take-up skyrockets due to the nature of the study, with baseline take-up being only 
1.57% and endline2 having a take-up of 34.09%. However, both banks and informal 
lending institutions experienced increases as well, at least between baseline and 
endline1. Bank loan take-up goes from 3.87% at baseline to 8.16% at endline1 to 
7.375% at endline2. The informal sector even experiences an increase in loans between 
baseline and endline1, as take-up increases from 62.78% to 73.37%, however by 
endline2 the take-up rate drops to 60.32%. Overall, the likelihood of anyone having any 
type of loan increases from 67.62% to 90.52% between baseline and endline2.  
There are a number of possibilities for why there is such an increase. This 
increase could by cyclical. Perhaps Hyderabad went through a period of massive 
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lending and much of these increases are uncorrelated with anything concretely 
measured. However, these banking and informal increases could be due to a spillover 
effect. Even though there does not appear to exist differential effects between treatment 
and control areas, it could be that banks are not operating on an area-by-area basis. This 
would happen if the banks think of the market differently, outside of the area-based 
markets and instead within a much larger market scope than what is measured. This 
would mean that much of what is measured here are spillovers from local markets to 
one another, and perhaps the area-based definition of a market is too small for the 
banking sector.  
However, it has been shown in previous research that informal lenders operate 
within these smaller, area-based local markets. Because of this type of operation, the 
informal sector sheds light on this spillover hypothesis. If it is true that many of these 
measurements are spillovers, there would have to exist significant triple difference 
coefficients for the informal sector. However, the triple differences are insignificant. 
This means that even the informal sector does not experience statistically significant 
differences between areas with MFI presence and those without. Therefore, the 
spillover theory has no empirical backing, as local markets are not differentially 
affected. This again supports a zero effect of MFI entry on the formal banking sector.  
 While there is a massive increase in lending throughout the study period, the 
lack of treatment differences demonstrates the lack of crowding-in effects in the sense 
of MFI-bank interactions. If people began financing bank loans with MFI loans, there 
would be some differential in bank loan take-up between treatment and control areas, as 
treatment areas would supposedly see an increase in bank loans as MFI lending 
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becomes commonplace. The lack of differences reveals the lack of crowding-in effects, 
both for bank-MFI sector interactions and for informal-MFI sector interactions.  
 Clientele characteristics for both banks and MFIs do have some overlap. 
Because there is some overlap in characteristics, this would instinctively mean that 
there is overlap in clientele. However, there are a multitude of variables that work 
against a person’s ability to have a loan in one sector and for their ability in another, 
such as head age, women employment index, and labor index. There are also a 
multitude of variables that are significant for one sector and not for the other. For 
instance, the variable ownland is strongly significant for banks yet insignificant for 
MFIs. This represents a characteristic of MFIs which is that they do not require 
collateral, so owning land does not matter as much for MFIs as it does for banks. The 
income index, lit, and head_no_education are three other variables that are only 
significant for banks and could contribute to the idea of why banks and MFIs lend. The 
income index and area literacy rates contribute positively to bank loan likelihood while 
the head having no education contributes negatively. Increased literacy, education, and 
income all signify less risky borrowers. As MFIs operate first and foremost to eradicate 
poverty while banks operate primarily as profit-generating institutions, it makes sense 
that these variables mean more to a bank than to an MFI.  
The regression to explain differences between MFI and bank borrowers 
produces some significant coefficients, showing there are significant differences in 
clientele between banks and MFIs. Furthermore, the table of means for those 
characteristics sheds light on how different these clientele groups really are. Because 
there are so many variables that have statistically significant different means, clients are 
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significantly different between banks and MFIs. Although both sectors might act 
positively toward a characteristic, such as both MFIs and banks becoming more likely 
to lend as the consumption index increases, clientele pools for each sector have 
statistically different average values for those characteristics. 
The fact that competition is not witnessed between the two industries is baffling, 
as I expected to see some competition between two sectors which both lend to 
individuals in the same areas. Yet, this zero-effect is the clear conclusion from what is 
shown in the difference in difference regressions that produced mostly insignificant 
estimates and the statistically different clientele characteristics between the two sectors. 
The effects seen in previous papers could be due to endogeneity consequences of their 
aggregated panel data, but it also could be that the differences found in those other 
papers simply cannot be picked up by this type of dataset. These other studies have 
focused on MFI activity surrounding bank presence, whereas I look at bank activity 
surrounding MFI presence. While I would still expect to see competition between MFIs 
and banks, much of the competition mentioned in previous research would not be 
picked up here. For instance, the differences between banking sector development 
described by Vanroose and D’Espallier cannot be seen here as this study looks at one 
banking sector. Nor can differentials between MFI structures, investigated by Cull, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch, be examined as this study is based off one MFI.  The 
country level income differences examined by Maksudova also cannot be accounted for 
because this data is collected in one city.  
While these papers conclude competition effects between the banking sector and 
the MFI sector, their conclusion is not necessarily contradictory to mine. My zero-effect 
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conclusion is on the local scale, and none of their results described differential effects 
on the local scale. My results add to, rather than contradict, their findings – while there 
might exist differences in MFI outreach dependent on banking sector differences, MFI 
institutional differences, and income differences across countries, local markets are 
relatively separated in MFI lending and bank lending. Because of this market 
separation, competitive and non-competitive areas within a city are not differentially 
affected. Because this zero effect is witnessed, formal banking sectors in areas where 
MFIs operate need not create hostile environments to drive out MFI competition, as 
MFIs are seen to not be direct competitors with banks. Instead, banks could work to aid 
MFIs in their goal to alleviate poverty, which some larger banks already do. This 
finding could also support potential government funding of MFIs as concerns 
surrounding negative competition consequences between growing sectors can be 
mitigated.  
Further research on this topic could cover a multiple of different characteristics. 
A more robust dataset, specifically a panel dataset, collected from a controlled study 
likened to this one would be extremely beneficial. A more thorough look at bank 
clientele, MFI clientele, and informal clientele characteristics could be derived from 
such a dataset and used to determine how clientele characteristics shift with MFI entry. 
While I attempt to begin this analysis, I cannot perform it thoroughly as all 
characteristic data comes from the two endlines and is not tracked over time on an 
individual level, only on an area level. Having such a panel would be an excellent 
complement to this analysis and would allow for a more intricate look at MFI entry 
effects on the banking sector.  
 41 
 
It would also be interesting to continue a more exhaustive analysis of different 
value indicators. This could be done by both expanding the amount of value indicators 
collected at the time of the study as well as looking at bank and MFI behavior based 
upon these different indicators. One could even move away from bank-MFI competition 
and examine the intricacies of how banks and MFIs act dependent on these indicators. 
This analysis would ignore treatment versus control to focus on bank and MFI lending 
behavior in high versus low value areas. This would contribute to the knowledge pools 
of MFI and formal banking determinants and efficacy in the developing world.  
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Conclusion 
 In this study, I examine differences in banking outcomes in response to MFI 
entry. I analyze whether banks compete with MFIs based on certain area characteristics, 
or value indicators, or whether the two institutions operate in separate marketplaces. I 
do this analysis by running differences in differences and triple difference regressions 
that take into consideration differences between measurement periods in the study, 
differences between treatment and control areas, and differences between value 
indicators that represent area characteristics banks and MFIs could be working off. I 
supplement my regression analyses with a clientele characteristic analysis to examine 
whether there is overlap in bank and MFI clientele.  
 I find there exists little to no effect of MFI entry on banking outcomes. There are 
no significant estimates of differential treatment effects on bank loan take-up or bank 
loan amount. Very few estimates that examine differences from baseline to an endline 
between treatment and control areas with respect to differences in area characteristics 
come out significant. While these significant exceptions are notable, the overarching 
conclusion supports a zero effect estimate of MFI entry on banking sector outcomes. 
There is also no support of a spillover hypothesis as the informal sector, a sector known 
to operate on an extremely local scale, also experiences no significant triple difference 
estimates. This zero-effect finding leads to the conclusion that banks and MFIs are 
operating in different marketspaces. This is backed up by the clientele characteristic 
analysis. While there does exist some overlap in characteristics, many characteristics 
have significantly different means between the two clientele pools, which means banks 
and MFIs have statistically different clientele.   
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While there are many conclusions this dataset cannot produce, the brilliance of 
this study allows me to thoroughly conclude that exogenous MFI entry does not appear 
to affect bank loan take-up or bank loan amounts. While there could be competition 
differentials on a larger scale, the lack of competition here shows that bank and MFI 
sectors operate in significantly different marketspaces and, on a local scale, interactions 
between the sectors do not statistically affect one another’s lending outcomes. 
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Tables 
Table 5: Banking Sector – Treatment Differences from Baseline to Endline1 
 Bank Bank Amount 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Male Head  -0.00237  -141.0 
  (0.00923)  (3,485) 
Head Age  0.00101***  428.7*** 
  (0.000268)  (101.2) 
Head No 
Education 
 -0.0378***  -9,304*** 
  (0.00607)  (2,293) 
Household Size  0.00505***  2,084*** 
  (0.00135)  (509.0) 
Endline01 0.0459*** 0.0401*** 2,968 1,002 
 (0.00967) (0.00876) (5,187) (3,307) 
Endline01 * 
Treatment 
0.000325 0.000904 4,823 5,035 
 (0.0127) (0.0123) (5,399) (4,631) 
Constant 0.0359*** -0.0144 3,647* -20,829*** 
 (0.00467) (0.0152) (1,912) (5,738) 
     
Observations 9,242 9,205 9,242 9,205 
R-squared 0.036 0.043 0.018 0.024 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Banking Sector – Treatment Differences from Baseline to Endline2 
 Bank Bank Amount 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Male Head  0.0161**  1,678 
  (0.00760)  (2,269) 
Head Age  0.000859***  211.5*** 
  (0.000267)  (79.73) 
Head No 
Education 
 -0.0234***  -4,615** 
  (0.00621)  (1,854) 
Household Size  0.00109  416.6 
  (0.00115)  (343.1) 
Endline02 0.0403*** 0.0360*** 206.9 -1,030 
 (0.00883) (0.00867) (4,614) (2,588) 
Endline02 * 
Treatment 
-0.00985 -0.00906 3,063 3,216 
 (0.0111) (0.0120) (4,704) (3,573) 
Constant 0.0381*** -0.00792 4,120** -6,369 
 (0.00392) (0.0141) (1,620) (4,221) 
     
Observations 8,573 8,549 8,573 8,549 
R-squared 0.027 0.031 0.019 0.021 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Banking Sector – Effects of Previous Banking Differences between Treatment 
and Control from Baseline to Endline1 on Bank Loan take-up 
 Bank 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
 
(2)  
Treatment 
(3)  
Control 
(4)  
     
Male Head -0.00353 -0.00290 0.0201 -0.0259* 
 (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0134) (0.0140) 
Head Age 0.00104*** 0.00101*** 0.00106*** 0.000986** 
 (0.000230) (0.000235) (0.000271) (0.000383) 
Head No 
Education 
-0.0365*** -0.0385*** -0.0356*** -0.0410*** 
 (0.00615) (0.00626) (0.00838) (0.00935) 
Household Size 0.00500*** 0.00510*** 0.00519** 0.00501*** 
 (0.00128) (0.00129) (0.00200) (0.00165) 
Endline01 0.0748*** 0.0799*** 0.0701*** 0.0796*** 
 (0.00887) (0.0165) (0.00901) (0.0165) 
Endline01 * 
Treatment 
 -0.00948   
  (0.0187)   
Endline01 * 
Already Banked 
-0.0599*** -0.0655*** -0.0550*** -0.0659*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0191) (0.0143) (0.0193) 
Endline01 * 
Treatment * 
Already Banked 
 0.0103   
  (0.0238)   
Constant -0.0146 -0.0141 -0.0361** 0.00651 
 (0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0164) (0.0224) 
     
Observations 9,560 9,205 4,757 4,448 
R-squared 0.047 0.046 0.041 0.052 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Banking Sector – Effects of Previous Banking Differences between Treatment 
and Control from Baseline to Endline1 on Bank Loan Amount 
 Bank Amount 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(5) 
 
(6)  
Treatment 
(7)  
Control 
(8)  
     
Male Head -236.2 -236.4 -411.0 -825.5 
 (1,515) (1,567) (2,621) (1,656) 
Head Age 432.3** 429.7** 93.94 791.5* 
 (201.0) (209.2) (83.69) (422.4) 
Head No 
Education 
-9,285*** -9,426*** -7,869*** -11,111** 
 (2,580) (2,667) (1,658) (5,293) 
Household Size 2,034*** 2,082*** 1,488* 2,773** 
 (655.1) (666.2) (790.1) (1,109) 
Endline01 9,622*** 12,511* 7,658*** 12,015* 
 (3,221) (7,106) (1,383) (6,838) 
Endline01 * 
Treatment 
 -5,329   
  (7,466)   
Endline01 * 
Already Banked 
-10,610** -18,933* -2,156 -19,012* 
 (5,184) (10,028) (2,835) (10,116) 
Endline01 * 
Treatment * 
Already Banked 
 16,773   
  (10,374)   
Constant -20,559** -20,863** -6,649 -35,822* 
 (9,889) (10,276) (4,368) (20,401) 
     
Observations 9,560 9,205 4,757 4,448 
R-squared 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.027 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Banking Sector – Effects of Business Differences between Treatment and 
Control from Baseline to Endline1 on Bank Loan take-up 
 Bank 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
 
(2)  
Treatment 
(3)  
Control 
(4)  
     
Male Head -0.00304 -0.00259 0.0205 -0.0257* 
 (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0133) (0.0141) 
Head No 
Education 
-0.0358*** -0.0379*** -0.0351*** -0.0404*** 
 (0.00612) (0.00624) (0.00827) (0.00941) 
Head Age 0.00105*** 0.00101*** 0.00107*** 0.000991** 
 (0.000230) (0.000236) (0.000271) (0.000383) 
Household Size 0.00495*** 0.00503*** 0.00507** 0.00499*** 
 (0.00128) (0.00131) (0.00202) (0.00166) 
Endline01 0.0452*** 0.0503*** 0.0398*** 0.0502*** 
 (0.00806) (0.0132) (0.00958) (0.0133) 
Endline01 * 
Treatment 
 -0.0105   
  (0.0162)   
Endline01 * Biz -0.0102 -0.0229 0.00254 -0.0238 
 (0.0131) (0.0193) (0.0179) (0.0195) 
Endline01 * Biz 
* Treatment 
 0.0256   
  (0.0264)   
Constant -0.0154 -0.0147 -0.0368** 0.00612 
 (0.0139) (0.0144) (0.0163) (0.0228) 
     
Observations 9,560 9,205 4,757 4,448 
R-squared 0.045 0.043 0.039 0.049 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Banking Sector – Effects of Business Differences between Treatment and 
Control from Baseline to Endline1 on Bank Loan Amount 
 Bank Amount 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(5) 
 
(6)  
Treatment 
(7)  
Control 
(8)  
     
Male Head -98.07 -4.415 -377.6 -395.4 
 (1,523) (1,585) (2,624) (1,664) 
Head No 
Education 
-9,184*** -9,229*** -7,782*** -10,802** 
 (2,551) (2,587) (1,655) (5,124) 
Head Age 431.7** 424.5** 94.34 780.3* 
 (200.4) (206.2) (83.43) (416.0) 
Household Size 2,022*** 2,101*** 1,492* 2,805** 
 (653.9) (671.3) (789.9) (1,122) 
Endline01 1,728 -5,059 8,395*** -5,438 
 (4,037) (7,672) (1,955) (7,948) 
Endline01 * 
Treatment 
 13,052*   
  (7,688)   
Endline01 * Biz 4,274 13,531 -4,481 13,169 
 (5,147) (9,811) (2,895) (9,594) 
Endline01 * Biz 
* Treatment 
 -18,200*   
  (10,230)   
Constant -20,424** -20,766** -6,959 -35,270* 
 (9,767) (10,180) (4,430) (20,166) 
     
Observations 9,560 9,205 4,757 4,448 
R-squared 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.026 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11: Banking Sector – Effects of Debt Differences between Treatment and Control 
from Baseline to Endline1 on Bank Loan take-up 
 Bank 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
 
(2)  
Treatment 
(3)  
Control 
(4)  
     
Male Head -0.00287 -0.00222 0.0205 -0.0250* 
 (0.0100) (0.0102) (0.0132) (0.0139) 
Head No 
Education 
-0.0358*** -0.0377*** -0.0351*** -0.0401*** 
 (0.00612) (0.00622) (0.00830) (0.00932) 
Head Age 0.00105*** 0.00101*** 0.00107*** 0.000980** 
 (0.000231) (0.000236) (0.000272) (0.000384) 
Household Size 0.00494*** 0.00505*** 0.00507** 0.00504*** 
 (0.00128) (0.00130) (0.00201) (0.00165) 
Endline01 0.0295*** 0.0244** 0.0347*** 0.0242** 
 (0.00779) (0.00994) (0.0121) (0.00996) 
Endline01 * 
Treatment 
 0.0104   
  (0.0155)   
Endline01 * 
Debt 
0.0173 0.0250 0.00922 0.0245 
 (0.0118) (0.0174) (0.0163) (0.0176) 
Endline01 * 
Debt * 
Treatment 
 -0.0157   
  (0.0238)   
Constant -0.0151 -0.0147 -0.0370** 0.00647 
 (0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0162) (0.0232) 
     
Observations 9,560 9,205 4,757 4,448 
R-squared 0.045 0.043 0.039 0.049 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12: Banking Sector – Effects of Debt Differences between Treatment and Control 
from Baseline to Endline1 on Bank Loan Amount 
 Bank Amount 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(5) 
 
(6)  
Treatment 
(7)  
Control 
(8)  
     
Male Head -78.22 -36.96 -394.5 -447.6 
 (1,523) (1,580) (2,625) (1,651) 
Head No 
Education 
-9,132*** -9,241*** -7,850*** -10,746** 
 (2,517) (2,577) (1,673) (5,090) 
Head Age 434.5** 430.6** 94.97 791.9* 
 (201.9) (209.7) (83.71) (423.3) 
Household Size 2,023*** 2,083*** 1,483* 2,781** 
 (652.1) (666.9) (790.3) (1,111) 
Endline01 -3,881 -10,062 3,425 -10,705 
 (6,183) (11,263) (2,333) (11,597) 
Endline01 * 
Treatment 
 12,951   
  (11,258)   
Endline01 * 
Debt 
11,479* 17,591 4,599 17,766 
 (6,468) (12,016) (3,100) (12,049) 
Endline01 * 
Debt * 
Treatment 
 -12,897   
  (12,358)   
Constant -20,737** -20,997** -6,702 -36,026* 
 (9,973) (10,381) (4,354) (20,596) 
     
Observations 9,560 9,205 4,757 4,448 
R-squared 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.026 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13: Banking Sector – Effects of Expenditure Differences between Treatment and 
Control from Baseline to Endline1 on Bank Loan take-up 
 Bank 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
 
(2)  
Treatment 
(3)  
Control 
(4)  
     
Male Head -0.00298 -0.00240 0.0206 -0.0254* 
 (0.0100) (0.0102) (0.0132) (0.0139) 
Head No 
Education 
-0.0359*** -0.0378*** -0.0350*** -0.0403*** 
 (0.00611) (0.00622) (0.00830) (0.00931) 
Head Age 0.00104*** 0.00100*** 0.00107*** 0.000969** 
 (0.000231) (0.000236) (0.000272) (0.000384) 
Household Size 0.00493*** 0.00505*** 0.00508** 0.00502*** 
 (0.00129) (0.00130) (0.00200) (0.00167) 
Endline01 0.0389*** 0.0346** 0.0422*** 0.0339** 
 (0.0100) (0.0161) (0.0124) (0.0161) 
Endline01 * 
Treatment 
 0.00744   
  (0.0202)   
Endline01 * 
Expend 
0.00366 0.01000 -0.00288 0.0104 
 (0.0129) (0.0199) (0.0167) (0.0201) 
Endline01 * 
Expend * 
Treatment 
 -0.0123   
  (0.0259)   
Constant -0.0146 -0.0141 -0.0372** 0.00794 
 (0.0142) (0.0146) (0.0165) (0.0229) 
     
Observations 9,560 9,205 4,757 4,448 
R-squared 0.045 0.043 0.039 0.049 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
53 
 
Table 14: Banking Sector – Effects of Expenditure Differences between Treatment and 
Control from Baseline to Endline1 on Bank Loan Amount 
 Bank Amount 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(5) 
 
(6)  
Treatment 
(7)  
Control 
(8)  
     
Male Head -139.3 -151.2 -425.6 -642.2 
 (1,520) (1,576) (2,621) (1,673) 
Head No 
Education 
-9,166*** -9,303*** -7,844*** -10,882** 
 (2,537) (2,621) (1,661) (5,190) 
Head Age 432.6** 428.7** 93.82 789.8* 
 (201.9) (209.8) (84.23) (423.7) 
Household Size 2,021*** 2,078*** 1,470* 2,785** 
 (654.7) (668.4) (791.1) (1,114) 
Endline01 3,212*** 1,427 4,882*** 1,314 
 (977.4) (1,516) (1,151) (1,623) 
Endline01 * 
Treatment 
 3,210*   
  (1,874)   
Endline01 * 
Expend 
737.9 -774.2 3,537 -1,565 
 (5,309) (9,505) (3,124) (9,532) 
Endline01 * 
Expend * 
Treatment 
 3,804   
  (10,009)   
Constant -20,549** -20,723** -6,360 -35,860* 
 (9,902) (10,310) (4,346) (20,501) 
     
Observations 9,560 9,205 4,757 4,448 
R-squared 0.024 0.024 0.029 0.026 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: Banking Sector – Effects of Literacy Rate Differences between Treatment 
and Control from Baseline to Endline1 on Bank Loan take-up 
 Bank 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
 
(2)  
Treatment 
(3)  
Control 
(4)  
     
Male Head -0.00341 -0.00265 0.0201 -0.0254* 
 (0.0100) (0.0102) (0.0133) (0.0138) 
Head No 
Education 
-0.0364*** -0.0384*** -0.0352*** -0.0413*** 
 (0.00610) (0.00621) (0.00831) (0.00927) 
Head Age 0.00105*** 0.00101*** 0.00108*** 0.000964** 
 (0.000232) (0.000237) (0.000274) (0.000385) 
Household Size 0.00487*** 0.00499*** 0.00497** 0.00501*** 
 (0.00128) (0.00131) (0.00203) (0.00165) 
Endline01 0.0164*** 0.0115 0.0227*** 0.0110 
 (0.00607) (0.00890) (0.00757) (0.00901) 
Endline01 * 
Treatment 
 0.0108   
  (0.0118)   
Endline01 * Lit 0.0449*** 0.0608*** 0.0296** 0.0609*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0185) (0.0145) (0.0186) 
Endline01 * Lit 
* Treatment 
 -0.0305   
  (0.0235)   
Constant -0.0130 -0.0124 -0.0357** 0.00964 
 (0.0138) (0.0143) (0.0159) (0.0229) 
     
Observations 9,560 9,205 4,757 4,448 
R-squared 0.046 0.045 0.040 0.052 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 16: Banking Sector – Effects of Literacy Rate Differences between Treatment 
and Control from Baseline to Endline1 on Bank Loan Amount 
 Bank Amount 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(5) 
 
(6)  
Treatment 
(7)  
Control 
(8)  
     
Male Head -169.2 -165.7 -437.6 -658.4 
 (1,519) (1,579) (2,630) (1,668) 
Head No 
Education 
-9,206*** -9,334*** -7,864*** -10,921** 
 (2,525) (2,601) (1,668) (5,144) 
Head Age 433.0** 428.9** 95.33 788.2* 
 (201.7) (209.6) (83.92) (423.1) 
Household Size 2,017*** 2,078*** 1,472* 2,780** 
 (654.4) (668.0) (791.7) (1,113) 
Endline01 1,684 -181.8 4,541*** -618.8 
 (1,132) (1,475) (1,570) (1,705) 
Endline01 * 
Treatment 
 4,302**   
  (2,138)   
Endline01 * Lit 3,498 2,523 3,211 2,299 
 (4,905) (10,893) (2,721) (10,828) 
Endline01 * Lit 
* Treatment 
 592.7   
  (11,230)   
Constant -20,466** -20,703** -6,541 -35,603* 
 (9,904) (10,298) (4,358) (20,439) 
     
Observations 9,560 9,205 4,757 4,448 
R-squared 0.025 0.024 0.029 0.026 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17: Banking Sector – Robustness Table, Value Indicator Variable Triple 
Interaction Coefficients 
  Baseline-Endline1 Baseline-Endline2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VALUE 
INDICATOR 
Cutoff Bank Bank 
Amount  
Bank Bank 
Amount 
      
Already  1 Table 7 Table 8 -0.00461 12,412 
Banked  (Table 7) (Table 8) (0.0187) (7,981) 
 2 -0.0186 -8,253 -0.00616 -808.7 
  (0.0282) (8,088) (0.0215) (6,970) 
Expenditures  50% Table 13 Table 14 -0.0302 2,098 
  (Table 13) (Table 14) (0.0217) (8,864) 
 75% -0.00203 8,758 -0.0355 8,148 
  (0.0275) (15,451) (0.0243) (13,623) 
Debt 50% Table 11 Table 12 -0.000414 -10,648 
  (Table 11) (Table 12) (0.0227) (12,324) 
 75% -0.0142 -16,188 -0.0126 -13,566 
  (0.0239) (14,438) (0.0234) (15,045) 
Businesses 50% Table 9 Table 10 -0.0111 -9,772 
  (Table 9) (Table 10) (0.0217) (8,492) 
 75% 0.0175 -20,101* -0.0258 -10,043 
  (0.0297) (12,015) (0.0225) (6,885) 
Literacy 50% Table 15 Table 16 -0.0413* 5,141 
  (Table 15) (Table 16) (0.0220) (10,038) 
 75% -0.0571 -5,558 -0.0538** 8,592 
  (0.0393) (17,148) (0.0255) (15,276) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 18: Informal Sector – Treatment Differences from Baseline to Endline1 and 
Endline2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Informal Informal 
Amount 
Informal Informal 
Amount 
     
Male Head 0.00650 -1,882 0.00339 1,041 
 (0.0167) (2,859) (0.0162) (2,124) 
Head No 
Education 
0.0661*** -3,107* 0.0620*** -76.50 
 (0.0113) (1,627) (0.0122) (1,813) 
Head Age -0.00207*** 553.1*** -0.00166*** 379.9*** 
 (0.000557) (89.46) (0.000631) (82.73) 
Household 
Size 
0.0137*** 4,106*** 0.0103*** 2,687*** 
 (0.00234) (538.7) (0.00269) (474.5) 
Endline01 0.107*** 9,474***   
 (0.0259) (2,645)   
Endline01 * 
Treatment 
-0.0509 1,028   
 (0.0324) (4,046)   
Endline02   -0.0448** 46.04 
   (0.0214) (2,694) 
Endline02 * 
Treatment 
  -0.00881 979.6 
   (0.0294) (3,997) 
Constant 0.631*** -12,399** 0.634*** -1,836 
 (0.0315) (5,070) (0.0305) (4,771) 
     
Observations 9,205 9,205 8,549 8,549 
R-squared 0.064 0.046 0.040 0.038 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 19: Informal Sector – Value Indicator Variable Triple Interaction Coefficients for 
Endline1 
  (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES Informal Informal 
Amount 
   
Already Banked 0.0391 7,487 
 (0.0700) (7,830) 
Expenditures 0.00926 -2,096 
 (0.0647) (8,040) 
Debt -0.0613 -4,491 
 (0.0591) (9,366) 
Businesses 0.0335 -12,501 
 (0.0652) (7,931) 
Literacy 0.00282 -8,650 
 (0.0646) (7,779) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All coefficients are for triple interaction terms. That is, the term that interacts high 
value indicator, endline01, and treatment.  
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Table 20: MFI Sector – Treatment Differences from Baseline to Endline1 and Endline2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES MFI MFI Amount MFI MFI Amount 
     
Male Head 0.0200 300.8 0.00630 191.9 
 (0.0127) (229.3) (0.0148) (324.6) 
Head No 
Education 
0.00844 26.48 0.000995 -296.1 
 (0.00973) (161.6) (0.0101) (296.4) 
Head Age -0.00108*** -10.89 -0.00227*** -29.84*** 
 (0.000386) (7.787) (0.000391) (11.06) 
Household Size 0.0129*** 262.7*** 0.0118*** 380.2*** 
 (0.00235) (45.93) (0.00226) (71.15) 
Endline01 0.151*** 1,749***   
 (0.0204) (295.7)   
Endline01 * 
Treatment 
0.0838** 1,255**   
 (0.0320) (592.5)   
Endline02   0.300*** 4,631*** 
   (0.0222) (506.5) 
Endline02 * 
Treatment 
  0.000143 686.7 
   (0.0338) (808.9) 
Constant -0.0122 -602.7 0.0534** -149.6 
 (0.0251) (432.1) (0.0229) (590.2) 
     
Observations 9,214 9,205 8,558 8,549 
R-squared 0.161 0.110 0.184 0.114 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 21: MFI Sector – Value Indicator Variable Triple Interaction Coefficients for 
Endline1 
  (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES MFI MFI Amount 
   
Already Banked 0.0335 611.7 
 (0.0638) (1,133) 
Expenditures -0.0508 -425.4 
 (0.0627) (1,146) 
Debt 0.120* 2,318* 
 (0.0647) (1,386) 
Businesses -0.0401 -992.0 
 (0.0637) (1,231) 
Literacy 0.0211 914.3 
 (0.0669) (1,307) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All coefficients are for triple interaction terms. That is, the term that interacts high 
value indicator, endline01, and treatment.  
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Table 22: Bank and MFI Loan Take-up Characteristics at Endline1 and 2 
  (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES Bank MFI 
   
Household Size 0.00393*** 0.0127*** 
 (0.00102) (0.00241) 
Male Head 0.00333 0.00969 
 (0.00921) (0.0176) 
Head Age 0.000798*** -0.00251*** 
 (0.000243) (0.000499) 
Head No Education -0.0190*** 0.000729 
 (0.00570) (0.0114) 
Old Business 0.0160** 0.0807*** 
 (0.00617) (0.0106) 
Area Population (baseline) -1.53e-05 6.93e-05 
 (2.56e-05) (9.31e-05) 
Already Banked (baseline) 0.0156** 0.0392 
 (0.00761) (0.0284) 
Biz (baseline) -0.0110 -0.0110 
 (0.00873) (0.0307) 
Expend (baseline) -0.00372 -0.0398 
 (0.00732) (0.0287) 
Lit (baseline) 0.0197** -0.0336 
 (0.00972) (0.0258) 
Own Land (baseline) 0.0171*** 0.00549 
 (0.00606) (0.0150) 
Women Employment Index -0.0115* 0.0397*** 
 (0.00619) (0.0136) 
Income Index 0.0196*** 0.00719 
 (0.00540) (0.00740) 
Labor Index -0.0157*** 0.0981*** 
 (0.00542) (0.0134) 
Consumption Index 0.0470*** 0.0141* 
 (0.00546) (0.00823) 
Social Index 0.0271*** 0.0423** 
 (0.0102) (0.0197) 
Constant 0.0106 0.260*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0504) 
   
Observations 12,689 12,689 
R-squared 0.028 0.045 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
These regressions are built from the sample of everyone in the study, not solely people 
who borrow, in order to look at loan take-up characteristics. 
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Table 23: Loan Take-up Characteristic Differentials for Source Type at Endline1 and 2 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Bank 
  
Household Size 0.00203 
 (0.00270) 
Male Head 0.0102 
 (0.0229) 
Head Age 0.00414*** 
 (0.000785) 
Head No Education -0.0522*** 
 (0.0166) 
Old Business -0.00894 
 (0.0130) 
Area Population (baseline) -7.02e-05 
 (8.83e-05) 
Already Banked (baseline) -0.0139 
 (0.0308) 
Biz (baseline) 0.0191 
 (0.0272) 
Expend (baseline) 0.0161 
 (0.0266) 
Lit (baseline) 0.0407** 
 (0.0161) 
Own Land (baseline) -0.0464*** 
 (0.0152) 
Women Employment Index 0.0269*** 
 (0.00840) 
Income Index -0.0809*** 
 (0.0132) 
Labor Index 0.0937*** 
 (0.0127) 
Consumption Index 0.0354 
 (0.0217) 
Social Index 0.0160 
 (0.0257) 
Constant 0.0404 
 (0.0559) 
  
Observations 4,374 
R-squared 0.057 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This sample is limited people that have either an MFI or bank loan. The statistically 
significant coefficients show the difference in bank borrowers from MFI borrowers. 
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Table 24: Loan Take-up Characteristic Means and Statistical Differences at Endline1 
and 2 
  Variable Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
VARIABLES Bank  MFI  
    
Household Size 6.176412 6.249798 -0.0733856 
 (2.345757) (2.478231) (-0.8435) 
Male Head 0.8937438 0.8575283 0.03621*** 
 (0.3083184) (0.3495804) (2.9869) 
Head Age 42.86879 41.09724 1.7715*** 
 (10.10958) (9.555749) (5.149) 
Head No Education 0.2085402 0.2976769 -0.08914*** 
 (0.4064668) (0.4572984) (-5.6117) 
Old Business 0.497992 0.5274966 -0.0295 
 (0.7010373) (0.7683152) (-1.0941) 
Area Population (baseline) 300.6065 313.1471 -12.54059** 
 (145.2239) (144.6328) (-2.44) 
Already Banked (baseline) 0.617443 0.5990299 0.0184131 
 (0.4862525) (0.490161) (1.0599) 
Biz (baseline) 0.3548067 0.3629749 -0.0081682 
 (0.478692) (0.4809225) (-0.4789) 
Expend (baseline) 0.4380575 0.3893829 0.0486746 
 (0.4963943) (0.4876761) (2.8004) 
Lit (baseline) 0.5698712 0.5184586 0.051412*** 
 (0.4953395) (0.4997265) (2.9031) 
Own Land (baseline) 0.3568588 0.3034557 0.053403*** 
 (0.4793109) (0.4598124) (3.2369) 
Women Employment Index -0.01242 0.034934 -0.047354*** 
 (0.4721381) (0.5093493) (-2.6588) 
Income Index 0.1733441 0.0287202 0.144624*** 
 (1.266404) (0.6780349) (4.8543) 
Labor Index -0.0082099 0.0883006 -0.096510*** 
 (0.412083) (0.4864337) (-5.7648) 
Consumption Index 0.2544555 0.0136535 0.240802*** 
 (0.8283451) (0.5493359) (10.9465) 
Social Index 0.0331547 0.0162216 0.0169331 
 (0.3043466) (0.329294) (1.4714) 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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